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Abstract 
Invalid voting and electoral absenteeism are two important sources of abstention 
in compulsory voting systems. Previous studies in this area have not considered 
the correlation between both variables and ignored the compositional nature of the 
data, potentially leading to unfeasible results and discarding helpful information 
from an inferential standpoint. In order to overcome these problems, this paper 
develops a statistical model that accounts for the compositional and hierarchical 
structure of the data and addresses robustness concerns raised by the use of small 
samples that are typical in the literature. The model is applied to analyze invalid 
voting and electoral absenteeism in Brazilian legislative elections between 1945 
and 2006 via MCMC simulations. The results show considerable differences in 
the determinants of both forms of non-voting; while invalid voting was strongly 
positively related both to political protest and to the existence of important 
informational barriers to voting, the influence of these variables on absenteeism is 
less evident. Comparisons based on posterior simulations indicate that the model 
developed in this paper fits the dataset better than several alternative modeling 
approaches and leads to different substantive conclusions regarding the effect of 
different predictors on the both sources of abstention. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The desire to provide a political system with popular legitimacy and to increase the 
representativeness of elected public officials have often been asserted as major 
arguments justifying the imposition of compulsory voting provisions (Verba et al., 
1978; Hill, 2002). Twenty-four countries, comprising approximately 20% of the 
world’s democracies, employ mandatory voting to some extent (Australian Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, 2000). Although compulsory voting has 
been found to be an effective mechanism for increasing turnout (Hirczy, 1994; 
Lijphart 1997), compelling voters to go to the polls does not automatically mean 
that they will cast a ballot for one of the candidates. Citizens can cast invalid votes, 
i.e., blank or null ballots, and thus their right not to vote remains intact (Lijphart, 
1997). In fact, a long-standing feature of compulsory voting systems is a higher rate 
of invalid ballots (Hirczy, 1994). In addition, since mandatory voting does not 
generate universal compliance (Hirczy, 1994; Power and Roberts, 1995), illegal 
abstention constitutes a second form of non-voting.  
Previous research on compulsory voting systems has focused either on the 
determinants of electoral absenteeism (e.g., Hirczy, 1994) or on the determinants of 
invalid voting (Power and Garand, 2007). The common approach of studies in this 
area has been to treat either the proportion of invalid votes or electoral absenteeism 
as the dependent variable and regress each of them on a set of explanatory 
variables. This standard procedure exhibits two main shortcomings. First, it does 
not take into account the connection between both sources of non-voting and the 
relationship between their determinants. Since, under compulsory voting, invalid 
voting and electoral absenteeism can be seen as “functional equivalents” of 
abstention, jointly modeling them may contribute to better understand abstention 
and its causes. Moreover, without a model for exploring the interrelation between 
these two sources of abstention, helpful information from an inferential standpoint 
maybe discarded because their correlation is assumed to be zero. As shown by 
Zellner (1971) and Thum (1997), changes in the standard error estimates that might 
result from a bivariate model could substantially modify the conclusions drawn 
from separate univariate analyses. Second, the prevailing modeling strategy ignores 
the “compositional” nature of the data (Aitchison, 1986), i.e., the fact that the 
proportions of invalid ballots, electoral absenteeism and votes for candidates or 
parties cannot be negative and that their sum must equal one. Ignoring these non-
negativity and unit-sum constraints might lead to unfeasible results, such as 
negative percentages of invalid ballots or sums of proportions greater or less than 
one (Katz and King, 1999).  
This paper develops a statistical model to address these problems, jointly 
analyzing the determinants of invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in district-
level elections. While national-level studies have the advantage of allowing more 
countries in the analysis, they are generally based on a small number of 
observations and may fail to capture the contextual and “neighborhood” effects that 
typically have considerable influence in local (e.g., legislative) elections (King, 
1997; Katz and King, 1999). In addition, given the absence of survey data covering 
large historical periods in many of the countries with compulsory voting, most of 
which are recently democratized Latin American nations (International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA, 2007), district-level elections allow 
studying both sources of abstention at the lowest possible level of aggregation.  
However, analyzing district-level elections introduces an additional 
methodological challenge. The proportion of invalid votes and absenteeism may be 
influenced not only by local variables but also by country-level factors affecting all 
districts in a given election (Power and Roberts, 1995), violating the standard 
assumption of independent and identically distributed errors. Hence, ignoring the 
hierarchical structure of the data and simply pooling national- and district-level 
variables may result in inefficient parameter estimates and negatively biased 
standard errors, potentially leading to “spuriously significant” statistical effects 
(Antweiler, 2001; Maas and Hox, 2004).  
Drawing on the literature on compositional data (Aitchison, 1986; Katz and 
King, 1999), and on multi-level modeling (Goldstein, 1995; Bryk and Raudenbush, 
2002; Gelman and Hill, 2007), the model presented here relates both sources of 
abstention in compulsory-voting systems, accounting for the compositional and 
hierarchical structure of the data and addressing robustness concerns raised by the 
use of small samples that are typical in the literature.  I illustrate the use of the 
model analyzing data on invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in Brazil’s lower 
house elections at the state level. Brazil has the largest electorate in the world 
subject to compulsory voting and has experienced considerable variations in 
institutional, political and socioeconomic conditions across history and between 
states, therefore providing an illuminating case to examine rival explanations of 
invalid voting and absenteeism. The percentage of blank and null ballots in the 
country has been historically larger and more volatile than in most other 
democracies with compulsory voting (Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de 
Janeiro, IUPERJ, 2006; IDEA, 2007), and absenteeism has remained relatively high 
despite mandatory voting.   
Power and Roberts (1995) used ordinary least square pooled time-series 
regressions to separately analyze the determinants of the two sources of abstention 
in legislative elections between 1945 and 1990, combining country-level and state-
level predictors by assigning the national variables to each state. I extend the period 
of analysis to include all the elections held up to 2006 and compare the results of 
the model developed in this paper with those obtained from other modeling 
strategies that that fail to account for the compositional and/or the hierarchical 
structure of the data. Based on posterior simulations, I show that the compositional-
hierarchical model leads to different substantive conclusions and fits the data better 
than these alternative approaches. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
reviews alternative theories for explaining invalid voting and absenteeism under 
compulsory voting systems. Section 3 presents the compositional-hierarchical 
model developed in this paper to analyze the determinants of invalid voting and 
absenteeism at the district level. Section 4 applies the model to analyze 16 lower 
house elections in Brazil and compares the performance of the compositional-
hierarchical model with competing approaches. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Alternative explanations of invalid voting and absenteeism 
 
Drawing on the literature on voter turnout in industrialized democracies, three basic 
explanations, focusing on socioeconomic factors, on institutional variables, and on 
“protest voting”, have been proposed to account for invalid voting and absenteeism 
in compulsory voting systems (Power and Roberts, 1995; Fornos et al., 2004; 
Power and Garand, 2007).  
Some scholars have argued that the high rate of blank and null ballots in 
polities with mandatory voting reflects the alienation of citizens from the political 
system and is the consequence of mobilizing disinterested and poorly informed 
citizens who would otherwise abstain (Jackman, 2001). Previous analyses (Power 
and Roberts, 1995; Power and Garand, 2007) found that socioeconomic variables 
such as urbanization, literacy and education levels substantially affect the 
percentage of blank and null ballots cast through their effect on voters’ perceived 
efficacy, access to information and development of political. Although the literature 
on electoral behavior has also found a strong correlation between these variables 
and political participation in voluntary voting settings (Verba et al., 1978; 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), empirical evidence from countries with mandatory 
voting (Power and Roberts, 1995; Fornos et al., 2004) suggests that the impact of 
socioeconomic factors on electoral absenteeism in these democracies is quite 
moderate.  
Other authors have underscored the role of the institutional context, party 
system and electoral design in explaining invalid voting and absenteeism. For 
instance, Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) concluded that a higher number of political 
parties depresses turnout by increasing the unpredictability of election and policy 
outcomes, and the same would apply for highly disproportional systems that punish 
minor parties and reduce voters’ perceived efficacy (Jackman and Miller, 1995). In 
the same direction, Power and Roberts (1995) provide evidence that variables like 
district magnitude and ballot structures have a considerable impact on invalid 
voting in mandatory voting settings.   
Finally, an alternative explanation can be traced to the literature on protest 
voting. A protest vote can be defined as a vote primarily cast to express discontent 
with politics, rather than to affect public policies (Kitschelt, 1995). In a system of 
compulsory voting, citizens’ discontent with the political establishment would 
translate into higher percentages of null and blank ballots and illegal abstention. 
This interpretation has often been quoted in Brazil and Latin America to explain 
temporary increases in invalid voting and absenteeism (Moisés, 1993; Escobar et 
al., 2002).  
Although the socioeconomic, institutional and protest approaches are 
usually presented as competing rather than as complementary explanations, 
previous research (Power and Roberts, 1995; Fornos et al., 2004) has shown that 
fusing them in a combined model helps to better understand the phenomena under 
study. However, these approaches are grounded in the literature on political 
participation in developed democracies, where invalid voting has received little 
academic attention (Power and Garand, 2007). Thus, past work has made no 
theoretical distinctions regarding the effect of the different sets of variables on 
invalid voting and electoral absenteeism. The underlying assumption in previous 
analyses has been that the same basic causal mechanisms account for both forms of 
non-voting (Power and Roberts, 1995). Furthermore, from a methodological 
perspective, previous studies failed to examine the potential interactions between 
the determinants of these two sources of abstention, implicitly assuming that the 
effect of the relevant predictors on invalid voting is independent of their impact on 
absenteeism. The statistical model presented in the next section allows me to test 
these assumptions. 
 
3. A statistical model of abstention under compulsory voting  
 
The model used to analyze the determinants of invalid voting and absenteeism at 
the district level is grounded in the literature on “compositional data” (Aitchison, 
1986; Katz and King, 1999) and on Bayesian hierarchical modeling (e.g., Gelman 
and Hill, 2007), although it is modified and adapted to the problem under study.  
Let ,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP  denote the proportion of invalid votes, electoral 
absenteeism and valid votes (i.e., votes for candidates or parties) among the 
electorate in district i  at election t ,  i =1,2…. n , , t =1,2…T . For all i  and t , ,
I
i tP ,
,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP  must satisfy the non-negativity and unit-sum constraint
[ ], 0,1 ,    , ,si tP s I A V∈ =  and   , , , 1I A Vi t i t i tP P P+ + = .  These constraints determine that 
,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP  fall in the simplex space, as illustrated by the ternary plot in Figure 
1. Each circle in the figure indicates the values of IP , AP  and VP  in a particular district 
for all lower house elections held in Brazil between 1945 and 2006.  
 
 
    Figure 1: Proportion of electoral absenteeism and valid/invalid votes in Brazil’s     
   lower house elections between 1945 and 2006. The diagonal lines parallel to the  
    triangle’s left side indicate the proportion of invalid votes, measured on the scale in    
    the triangle’s base. The diagonal lines parallel to the right side mark the proportion  
    of valid votes,  measured on the scale in the triangle’s left side, and the dashed  
    horizontal lines indicate the proportion of electoral absenteeism, measured on the  
    triangle’s right side.  
 
A model aimed at analyzing the determinants of abstention in compulsory 
voting systems must take these constraints into account.  Neither the standard 
approach of regressing invalid voting and absenteeism independently on a set of 
predictors nor estimating a system of seemingly unrelated equations satisfies both 
constraints, even if the point predictions obtained from these models happen to fall 
within the boundaries of the simplex (Katz and King, 1999). In order to address this 
problem, I adapt Aitchison’s (1986) and Katz and King’s (1999) models for 
compositional data, implementing a bivariate mixed model for invalid voting and 
electoral absenteeism.  
Let ( ), , ,lnI I Vi t i t i tY P P=  and ( ), , ,lnA A Vi t i t i tY P P=  denote the log-ratios of the 
proportion of invalid votes and absenteeism relative to valid votes, respectively.1
,
I
i tP
 
Note that, unlike the baseline composites , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP , ,
I
i tY  and ,
A
i tY  are 
unbounded and unconstrained. The variables of interest for the analysis, ,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP , 
are obtained from , , ,,
I A
i t i t i tY Y Y =    through the additive logistic transformations:  
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Since the , ,   ,
s
i tY s I A= , are defined over the whole real line, it is possible to 
model , , ,,
I A
i t i t i tY Y Y =   using a normal/independent distribution (Seltzer et al., 2002) 
that assigns weight parameters to each observation in the sample:  
 
                                     ,, ,
,
   i ti t i t
i t
Y
w
ε
µ= +                                           (3), 
                                                 
1 Due to the logarithmic transformations involved, the baseline composites are assumed to be strictly 
positive. This poses no problem for the type of electoral data considered here. Alternative models 
based on Box-Cox transformations (e.g., Rayens and Srinivasan, 1991) have been proposed to deal 
with the potential problem of null composites in other settings. 
 where 
'
, , ,,
I A
i t i t i tµ µ µ =   , ( )
'
, , ,, N 0, 
I A
i t i t i tε ε ε = Σ   , ,i tw  is a positive random 
variable with density ( ),i tp w υ , and υ  is a scalar or vector-valued parameter. Due 
to the unconstrained properties of Σ , the model now allows for any pattern of 
dependency between ,
I
i tP  and ,
A
i tP . This is one of the advantages of the 
normal/independent assumption vis-à-vis other distributions (e.g., Dirichlet or S-
, 1 ,i tw i t= ∀
) 
commonly used in the statistical analysis of compositional (Barndorff-Nielsen and 
Jørgensen, 1991). It is also worth noting that, besides including the bivariate normal 
as a particular case (when ), the specification in (3) comprises a variety 
of thick-tailed distributions often useful for robust inference (Rosa et al., 2003).  
Since ,
I
i tµ  and ,
A
i tµ   are unbounded, it is possible to model them as linear 
functions of relevant covariates. As mentioned in the introduction, it seems 
plausible that the proportion of invalid votes and electoral absenteeism in a district 
is influenced not only by district-level variables but also by national conditions that 
vary across elections. Furthermore, the impact of these district-level variables on 
invalid voting and absenteeism might itself be mediated by the country-level 
factors. In order to account for these possibilities, I use a hierarchical random-
coefficients model for the components of ,i tµ . The first-level equations model ,
I
i tµ  
and ,
A
i tµ  as functions of district-level variables measured at a particular election. 
The second-level equations specify the first-level coefficients as functions of 
country-level variables measured contemporaneously with the district level 
variables, plus zero-expectation random effects aimed at accounting for election-to-
election variability beyond that explained by national-level variables. In addition, I 
also introduce zero-mean random intercepts in order to accommodate time-constant 
heterogeneity across districts. This modeling strategy strikes a balance between a 
completely pooled approach, which ignores the clustered nature of the data and the 
potential variability between districts and elections, and local regressions that are 
likely to be highly unstable when the number of districts or elections in the sample 
is relatively small (Browne and Draper, 2001). 
Letting ,i tx  and tz  represent ( )1 K×  and ( )1 L×  row vectors of district -
level and country-level variables, respectively, the specification adopted is then:  
 
                                        , , +i t i t t iXµ β λ=                                                (4),                                                           
 
        t t tZβ δ η= +                                                     (5), 
  
where , 2 , 2i t i tX I x I = ⊗  ; ( )2 1 1t tKZ I z+  = ⊗   ; tβ   and δ  are ( )2 1K +  and 
( )( )2 1 1K L+ +  vectors or random and fixed coefficients, respectively; and 
( )0,t N ηη Ω ,  ( )0,i N λλ Ω  are  election- and district- random effects.2
,
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From (3) - (5), the model can be written as: 
 
                                                                (6), 
 
with error terms ,i tε  and random effects tη  and iλ  assumed mutually independent. 
Given the small sample sizes typically available for countries with 
mandatory voting (IDEA, 2007), Bayesian inference provides an attractive 
alternative to frequentist estimation in this setting. In particular, unlike with Full or 
Restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation, inference about the fixed effects 
                                                 
2 ⊗  denotes the left Kronecker product. 
within the Bayesian framework does not depend on the accuracy of the point 
estimates of the variance-covariance parameters. Instead, it is based on the posterior 
distributions given only the data, averaging over the uncertainty for all the 
parameters in the model (Goldstein, 1995; Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002). Taking 
into account the uncertainty in the estimation of the random parameters is 
especially important in small datasets, where the variance components are usually 
very imprecisely estimated (Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002).3
The joint posterior density of the model’s parameters is intractable 
analytically, but inference can be performed by Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) simulations. Adopting conjugate priors for the fixed effects and precision 
matrices and assuming Normal level-1 residuals - i.e., if all the 
 In addition, as shown 
by Browne and Draper (2001), Maximum Likelihood methods generally exhibit 
convergence problems in two-level random-coefficients regression models with few 
higher-level units. 
, ,  1,..., ,  1,...,i tw i n t T= =
, have degenerate distributions at 1 - leads to closed form conditional distributions 
for each of the parameters, and thus it is straightforward to approximate the 
corresponding marginals using Gibbs sampling.4
,i tY
 However, the assumption of 
Normal level-1 residuals makes inferences vulnerable to the presence of outliers 
(Gelman, et al., 2004). In contrast, adopting a bivariate Student-t prior for  allows 
attenuating the influence of extreme observations and helps assessing the sensitivity 
of inferences to prior distributional assumptions (Carlin and Louis, 1996).   
                                                 
3 In the context of frequentist estimation, this uncertainty can be taken into account through 
bootstrapping (Goldstein, 1995) or post-estimation simulation (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). 
However, the fact that the Bayesian approach allows directly accounting for the uncertainty in the 
estimates of the variance coefficients without the need for further steps makes it particularly 
appropriate for this kind of analysis.  
4 The full conditional posterior distributions are derived in the Appendix. 
A bivariate Student t prior for ,i tY  can be obtained from the normal/independent 
distribution by assuming ( ), / 2, / 2i tw Gammaυ υ υ , , 0,  0i tw υ> > .5
, ,, '
I A
i t i tε ε  
 While it might be 
argued that working directly with a bivariate Student t density for  would 
be preferable to adding nT parameters to the model, the conditioning feature of the 
Gibbs sampler makes the augmentation of the parameter space quite natural (Carlin 
and Louis, 1996). In addition, this specification allows obtaining estimates of the 
weight parameters ,i tw , which can be useful to identify possible outliers (Rosa et al., 
2003). The weight assigned to each observation in calculating posterior 
distributions of fixed-effects and level-1 regression parameters will depend on the 
posterior probabilities of the possible values of υ . Specifically, the posterior mean 
of , ,  1,..., ,  1,...,i tw i n t T= =  is given by:
 
( ) ( ) ( ), 1, , , ,
2
'  i t i t i t t i i t i t t i
E w
Y X Y X
υ
β λ β λ υ−
+
⋅⋅⋅ =
− − Σ − − +
  
 
                                 (7), 
 
where ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  stands for conditioning on the data and on the remaining parameters.6
υ
 
Hence, for a large enough , the posterior mean of ,i tw  approaches 1, leading to 
roughly normal tails are obtained for the level-1 errors. However, for low values of 
υ , the posterior mean of ,i tw  decreases as ( ) ( )1, , , ,'  i t i t t i i t i t t iY X Y Xβ λ β λ−− − Σ − −  
increases. υAlthough the conditional posterior of  does not have a closed form, it 
can be approximated by discretizing the density along a grid of values and then 
sampling from the resulting discrete distributions.7
                                                 
5 I use the parametrization of the gamma distribution found in Rosa et al. (2003).  
6 See equation (25’) in the Appendix. 
7 See equation (26’) in the Appendix. 
 When the points in the grid are 
spaced closely together, the discrete distribution of υ  provides an accurate 
approximation to the full conditional distribution (Seltzer et al., 2002).8
,
I
i tP
   
The two variants of the model (with bivariate normal or bivariate Student-t 
level-1 errors) can be compared using standard Bayesian criteria for model 
selection such as the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) or Bayes factors 
(Spiegelhalter et al. 2002; Gelman et al., 2004).  The means and standard deviation 
of the convergent samples obtained under each of these variants can be used to 
summarize the posterior distributions of the parameters. These marginal posteriors, 
however, are of no direct interest for the analysis. Rather, my focus lies on the 
effect of the explanatory variables on the proportion of invalid voting and electoral 
absenteeism. I thus compute the impact of each of the district- and country-level 
regressors on  and ,
A
i tP  using average predictive comparisons (Gelman and Hill, 
2007).  
Some aspects of the model deserve further comment. First, while in the 
presentation above it has been assumed that  , 1,...iT T i i n= ∀ =  in order to simplify 
the notation, the model can accommodate unbalanced data sets, with different 
number of elections per district. In fact, the ability and flexibility to deal with 
nested unbalanced data sets is another advantage of Bayesian multilevel models 
versus frequentist approaches (Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002). Second, a more 
complex specification for the components of Σ  could be adopted - e.g., allowing 
for serial correlation of the level-1 errors. Nonetheless, given the relatively small 
number of observations available in the application of Section 4 (with very few 
elections per state in some cases) and the inclusion of district random-effects, an 
i.i.d. assumption for the components of Σ  seems appropriate (Carlin and Louis, 
1996; Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002). Finally, although I focus on two particular 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, a strategy based on Metropolis-Hastings algorithm sampling can be incorporated into 
the Gibbs sampling scheme to obtain draws from υ  (Seltzer et al., 2002). 
variants of the bivariate mixed model – i.e., with Normal and Student-t level-1 
errors – assuming alternative densities for ,i tw  would allow obtaining several other 
thick-tailed distributions – e.g., slash and contaminated Normals, as in Rosa et al. 
(2003) - that might be appropriate to account for the presence of outliers in other 
applications.  
 
4. Analyzing invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in 
Brazil’s lower house elections 
 
4.1. Data and methodology 
 
Brazil provides an interesting case to analyze the determinants of abstention in 
countries with mandatory voting. While invalid ballots in advanced democracies 
under compulsory voting such as Australia and the Netherlands have historically 
averaged about 2 to 3 percent, the equivalent rates in Brazil have been substantially 
higher and more volatile over time, reaching almost 42 percent of the votes cast in 
the 1994 lower house election (Power and Roberts, 1995; IUPERJ, 2006). In 
addition, despite the fact that voting has been compulsory in the country for over 60 
years, electoral absenteeism has averaged 19 percent in elections held over this 
period, varying from 5 to 34.5 percent (IUPERJ, 2006).  Changes in the institutional 
design and the freeness and fairness of the elections in Brazil’s recent history, 
together with the sharp differences in socio-demographic characteristics among its 
states, allow examining the impact of variables of interest on the different forms of 
non-voting.9
                                                 
9 A description of the institutional, socioeconomic and political context of Brazilian elections 
exceeds the purposes of this paper. An overview can be found in Power and Roberts (1995).  
 In order to illustrate the use of the model presented in Section 3 and to 
compare the results with those obtained using alternative empirical strategies, I 
analyze all lower house elections held in the country between 1945 and 2006. The 
dataset has an unbalanced structure, with 388 observations for 27 states across 16 
elections.10
 
Figure 2: Invalid voting and absenteeism by in Brazilian lower house elections 
between 1945 and 2006, as a proportion of the electorate in each state.  
 
  
                                                 
10 The number of states in Brazil increased from twenty-two to twenty-seven during this period. 
The dependent variables for the analysis are the proportion of invalid votes 
and electoral absenteeism in lower house elections. The former is computed as the 
ratio of blank and null votes cast over the population eligible to vote. The latter, in 
turn, is calculated as the percentage of potential voters failing to comply with their 
duty. Figure 2 summarizes the evolution of the two variables between 1945 and 
2006, discriminated by state. As can be seen, there is considerable variation in the 
two sources of abstention both between states and within states across elections, as 
well as possible geographical and temporal correlation between them.11
Based on the different hypothesis reviewed in Section 2, socioeconomic, 
institutional and protest variables are included as explanatory variables in the 
statistical model. The socioeconomic variables used are: Illiteracy, the percentage 
of the state’s voting-age population classified as illiterate; Urbanization, the 
percentage of the state’s population living in urban areas; and FEAP, the percentage 
of females in the Economically Active Population, used as a measure of women’s 
status and the state’s level of modernization. The institutional variables are: the 
number of Candidates per seat;  Franchising, a dichotomous variable coded 1 for 
elections after 1985, when suffrage was extended to the illiterates, and 0 otherwise; 
Electorate, measured as the percentage of the state’s total population eligible to 
vote; and Ballot, a dummy variable coded one for elections following the 
introduction of the single official ballot in 1962, that requires voters to write their 
candidate’s name or registration number on a blank ballot and replaced the previous 
system of pre-printed ballots.
  
12
                                                 
11 The proportions are calculated based on the number of elections held in each state. 
12 Prior to the introduction of the single official ballot (“cedula unica”), candidates distributed their 
own pre-printed ballots, which voters simply had to introduce in the ballot box. While this required 
considerably less information on the part of voters, it tended to favor wealthier candidates to the 
detriment of less affluent ones (Power and Roberts, 1995). 
 Finally, among the protest variables, Manipulation 
measures the degree of electoral manipulation and “political engineering”, coded by 
Power and Roberts (1995) on a four point-scale ranging from 0 for free elections 
held under democratic rule to 3 for elections conducted under authoritarian tutelage; 
Growth is a two-year moving average of the percentage change in the national 
GDP; and Inflation is the natural logarithm of the country’s average inflation rate in 
the two years preceding the election. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 
state- and country-level predictors for the period 1945-2006. 
 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min  percentile Max  percentile 
State-level predictors       
Illiteracy (%) 40.0 20.8 4.7 24.6 58.9 79.8 
Urbanization (%) 55.4 21.0 2.6 38.1 72.1 96.6 
Females in the EAP (FEAP) (%) 23.3 16.4 3.0 10.3 40.8 58.1 
Candidates per seat 4.4 2.8 1.0 2.3 6.0 15.4 
Electorate (%) 40.4 19.2 6.9 24.3 59.0 74.4 
Country-level predictors       
Franchising 0.4 0.5 0 0 1 1 
Ballot 0.8 0.4 0 0.8 1 1 
Electoral Manipulation 0.9 1.1 0 0 1.3 3 
Growth (%) 5.3 3.6 -1.7 3.7 7.6 11.1 
Inflation  3.7 1.7 1.7 2.7 4.2 7.5 
Number of States 27 
Number of Elections 16 
Observations 388 
Table 1:  Summary statistics for state- and country-level predictors.  
 
The characterization and measurement of the independent variables closely 
follows Power and Roberts (1995). The only difference with them lies in the 
definition of Illiteracy. While the authors use the percentage of the state’s electorate 
classified as illiterate (zero until 1985, when illiterates were enfranchised), I use the 
percentage of illiterates in the state’s voting-age population. Although illiterates 
were not allowed to vote in Brazil until the 1986 election, the fact that more than 
sixty percent of the population had not finished the fourth grade by 1986, coupled 
with the difficulty of obtaining alternative reliable indicators covering the period 
under study led me to use illiteracy as a measure of the electorate’s political skills 
(Power and Garand, 2007). In order to account for the effect of the enfranchisement 
of illiterates, I include the country-level variable Franchising in the model, 
allowing it to mediate the effect of Illiteracy on abstention across elections.  
In addition, in line with Power and Roberts’ (1995) argument that the 
country-level predictors Ballot, Manipulation, Growth and Inflation affect the 
proportion of invalid voting and absenteeism in each state-year, I specify the 
election random-intercepts as functions of these variables. Given the small number 
of observations in the sample (Table 1), the coefficients of the remaining district-
level variables are treated as fixed effects (i.e., their variation across elections is 
constrained to be 0), although the model can accommodate more general 
specifications.  
The following equations define the hierarchical model for district 
,  1,...,  i i n= at election ,  1,...,  t t T= :   
 
         
, 0, 1, , 2, , 3, ,
,
4, , 5, ,
,
         +  
s s s s s
i t t t i t t i t t i t
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t i t t i t i
i t
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w
β β β β
ε
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= + + + +
+ +
                    
(8), 
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s s s s s s s
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                         1, 1,0 1,1 1,
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                                    , ,0 ,   2,...,5
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( )
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,
,
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2 2
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i t Y
p w
Gamma i t Y
υ υ υ
 ∀

=    ∀  
 
              (12). 
 
The model was fit using WinBUGS, as called from R.13
( ),N I0 100
 All the 
hyperparameters were assigned diffuse priors in order to let the data dominate the 
form of the posterior densities: the fixed effects were assigned a  prior, 
while Wishart priors with identity scale matrix and degrees of freedom equal to 
( ) 1rank I +  were used for the precision matrices. In order to ensure that inferences 
are data dependent, several alternative values for the hyperparameters were tried, 
yielding similar substantive results. Three parallel chains with dispersed initial 
values were run for 25,000 cycles, with a burn-in of 5,000 iterations. Convergence 
was assessed based on Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) estimated potential scale 
reduction factor.   
 
 
                                                 
13 The code is available from the author on request. 
4.2. Results of the compositional-hierarchical model 
 
Table 2 below reports the posterior means and 90% credible intervals for the fixed 
effects under the two variants of the model presented in Section 3: assuming 
bivariate Normal (Model 1-a) and bivariate Student-t (Model 1-b)  level-1 priors.14
IY
 
The table shows considerable disparity in the posterior means and credible intervals 
of the fixed effects under both models, particularly regarding the effect of state-
level predictors on the log-ratios and AY .15
Parameters 
 Comparisons between the two models 
based on both the DIC and Bayes Factor favor Model 1-b, indicating that the model 
with Student-t level-1 errors fits the data better.  
 
Model 1-a 
Gaussian  level-1 errors  
Model 1-b 
Student-t level-1 errors  
IY  AY  IY  AY  
Illiteracy 
-0.03 
(-0.94, 0.90) 
0.76 
(0.19, 1.35) 
0.24 
(-0.52, 1.01) 
0.74 
(0.18, 1.24) 
Urbanization 
-0.88 
(-1.65, -0.13) 
-0.14 
(-0.58, 0.34) 
-0.15 
(-0.79, 0.49) 
-0.17 
(-0.62, 0.27) 
FEAP 
2.30 
(0.64, 3.98) 
-0.18 
(-1.27, 0.87) 
1.00 
(-0.24, 2.24) 
0.48 
(-0.42, 1.40) 
Candidates per seat 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
                                                 
14 In addition, I also estimated the model under the assumption of multivariate Student-t priors for the 
random coefficients.  The main results, however, are virtually unchanged when assuming heavy tails 
at the higher-level of the model. Thus, I retain the assumption of multivariate normality at level-2 
and focus on the effect of adopting alternative priors for the data model.   
15 It is worth noting that, when treating υ  as unknown, the uncertainty regarding υ  is propagated 
into the posterior distribution of the fixed-effects parameters (Seltzer et al., 2002).  
(0.01, 0.06) (-0.01, 0.02) (-0.01, 0.04) (-0.01, 0.02) 
Electorate 
1.50 
(0.62, 2.55) 
 0.74 
(0.17, 1.30) 
1.30 
(0.42, 2.17) 
0.47 
(-0.15, 1.10) 
Franchising 
1.50 
(0.70, 2.30) 
0.66 
(0.07, 1.27) 
1.50 
(0.75, 2.32) 
0.49 
(-0.04, 1.02) 
Ballot 
-0.04 
(-0.82, 0.68) 
-0.19 
(-0.97, 0.60) 
0.22 
(-0.45, 0.93) 
-0.27 
(-0.98, 0.50) 
Manipulation 
0.52 
(0.24, 0.85) 
0.33 
(0.03, 0.64) 
0.41 
(0.15, 0.67) 
0.36 
(0.07, 0.66) 
Growth 
4.30 
(-2.40, 11.20) 
-5.40 
(-14.1, 2.90) 
5.00 
(-1.70, 11.60) 
-5.50 
(-13.70, 2.90) 
Inflation 
0.38 
(0.23, 0.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.17, 0.17) 
0.34 
(0.20, 0.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.16, 0.18) 
Intercept 
-5.40 
(-6.50, -4.30) 
-1.90 
(-3.02, -0.86) 
-5.30 
(-6.40, -4.20) 
-2.0 
(-3.10, -0.90) 
 N (first level) 388 388 
DIC 557.90 242.30 
Bayes factor - 9.79 ×  
Table 2: Estimated posterior means and 90% confidence intervals for fixed effects  
under alternative distributional assumptions for the error terms. 
 
The evidence presented in Figures 3 and 4 further supports Model 1-b. 
Figure 3 plots the mean posterior values of the standardized univariate and bivariate 
level-1 residuals from Model 1-a for the 388 observations in the dataset.  
 
 
  Figure 3: Posterior means of the level-1 residuals from Model 1-a. The circles 
represent the standardized univariate and bivariate level-1 residuals, computed based on the 
statistics proposed by Weiss (1994): 
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2 1 , 3 .k  =2αχ α−= ×Φ −   
A few data points have standardized univariate residuals with absolute 
values larger than 5, and more than 2% of the observations are clear bivariate 
outliers, suggesting that a thick-tailed distribution might be better suited to the data.  
In the same direction, the mean posterior estimate of υ  under Model 1-b is 
3.3, with its marginal posterior density concentrated around small values (Figure 4-
a), indicating very strong departure from Normality and pointing to a heavy-tailed 
error distribution. As noted in Section 3, small values of υ  determine that 
observations are weighted by an inverse function of the Mahalanobis distance 
( ) ( )1, , , ,'  i t i t t i i t i t t iY X Y Xβ λ β λ−− − Σ − − , adjusted by the degrees of freedom. 
Hence, for those observations identified as (bivariate) outliers in the model with 
Normal level-1 errors, the posterior probability that ,i tw   is equal or greater than 1 is 
negligible, as illustrated in Figure 4-b. Overall, the posterior probability that 
( ), 1i tP w ≥  is less than 1% for roughly 6% of the observations in the sample, 
providing strong evidence of outliers (Rosa et al, 2003). In addition, given that the 
“weight parameters” also reduce the influence of extreme observations on the 
posterior distribution of the election- and state- random coefficients, the number of 
level-2 bivariate outliers in Model 1-b is also halved with respect to Model 1-a, as 
shown in Figure 5. Hence, since the different comparison criteria examined above 
favor the model with Student-t errors, I focus on the results from Model 1-b in the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
 
Figure 4: Posterior densities of υ  and ,i tw  under Model 1-b. The upper panel of plots 
the posterior distribution of the degrees of freedom parameter of the Student-t distribution 
assumed for the error terms under Model 1-b. The lower panel plots the posterior 
distribution of the weight parameters for the states of Rondonia (RO), Roraima (RR) and 
Pernambuco (PE) in the 1958, 1970 and 1950 lower house elections. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Posterior means of the standardized election residuals and  marginal 
posterior means of the weight parameters. The circles in Figure 5-a represent the 
posterior means of the standardized election residuals, computed as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' 1
1
1 J j j j j j
t t t t
j
Z Z
J η
β δ β δ−
=
− Ω −∑ (Weiss, 1994). The dashed horizontal lines are 
drawn at ( ) ( )
2
4 1 , 3 .k  =2αχ α−= ×Φ −  The circles in Figure 5-b correspond to the marginal 
posterior means of the weight parameters for each state, by election-year. 
 
Table 3 reports the posterior distribution of the covariance components from 
the chosen model.  
 Level 1-errors  
  Invalid Voting Absenteeism  
 Invalid Voting 0.17 (0.03, 0.54)  
 
 Absenteeism 0.03 (0.01, 0.09) 
0.08 
(0.01, 0.26) 
 
     
 Level 2: State random effects  
  Invalid Voting Absenteeism  
 
Invalid Voting 
0.16 
(0.09, 0.26) 
 
 
 
Absenteeism 
0.01 
(-0.04, 0.05) 
0.11 
(0.07, 0.16) 
 
     
Level 2: Election random effects 
 Invalid voting 
Intercept 
Invalid voting  
Illiteracy 
Absenteeism  
Intercept 
Absenteeism  
Illiteracy 
Invalid voting 
Intercept 
0.27 
(0.12, 0.51) 
   
Invalid voting  
Illiteracy 
-0.06 
(-0.32, 0.14) 
0.62 
(0.24, 1.27) 
  
Absenteeism  
Intercept 
0.05 
(-0.14, 0.27) 
-0.07 
(-0.39, 0.23) 
0.50 
(0.22, 0.96) 
 
Absenteeism  
Illiteracy 
-0.01 
(-0.18, 0.14) 
0.17 
(-0.06, 0.52) 
-0.12 
(-0.40, 0.09) 
0.29 
(0.12, 0.56) 
Table 3: Posterior means of variance-covariance components under Model 1-b. 
Numbers in parenthesis are the 90% credible intervals. 
The mean posterior correlation between the level-1 errors is moderately 
positive (0.24) and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. States that experience 
higher relative proportions of invalid voting in an election than predicted by the 
model also exhibit higher relative proportions of electoral absenteeism, 
contradicting the assumption of no correlation underlying separate univariate 
analyses of invalid voting and absenteeism. In addition, the bottom panel of Table 3 
reveals that there is considerable variation in the election effects beyond that 
explained by the national-level variables included in the model. While the average 
correlations in IY  and AY  within states across elections are 0.28 and 0.24, 
respectively, the corresponding intra-election correlations between states are as 
large as 0.57 and 0.75, indicating that election-specific circumstances have a 
substantial influence on both forms of abstention. 
Based on the convergent Gibbs samples of Model 1-b’s parameters, I 
estimate the average effect of a unit change in each of the state- and national-level 
predictors on the proportion of invalid ballots and electoral absenteeism.16
                                                 
16 In the case of the two binary variables, Ballot and Franchising, the effect is measured as a change 
from 0 to 1.  
 The 
results, reported in Table 4, reveal some interesting discrepancies regarding the 
determinants of the two sources of abstention. While only Illiteracy had a positive 
and significant effect on electoral absenteeism at the usual confidence levels, 
invalid voting in Brazil’s lower house elections was strongly and positively related 
both to the average education and political skills levels among the electorate and to 
political protest. The proportion of blank and spoiled ballots rose by 0.09 
percentage points for each percentage-point increase in the share of illiterates in the 
voting-age population. The extension of suffrage to illiterates in 1985 drove 
boosted invalid voting further by more than 6 points. In the same direction, each 
percent increase in the fraction of the states’ population eligible to vote was 
associated to a 0.13 percentage-point rise in blank and null votes.  
 Predictor 
Effect on 
Invalid voting 
Effect  on 
electoral absenteeism 
Illiteracy 
0.09
(0.05) 
* 0.13
(0.05) 
** 
Urbanization  
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
FEAP 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
Candidates per seat 
0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.26 
(0.17) 
Electorate  
0.13
(0.06) 
** 0.07 
(0.06) 
Franchising 
6.15
(2.57) 
*** 1.03 
(2.35) 
Official Ballot 
2.73 
(4.17) 
-5.85 
(8.09) 
Electoral manipulation 
3.37
(2.21) 
* 4.52 
(3.44) 
Growth 
0.67 
(0.45) 
-1.00 
(0.82) 
Inflation 
0.04
(0.01) 
*** -0.01 
(0.02) 
Table 4: Effect of a one-unit change in the predictors on invalid voting and 
absenteeism under Model 1-b (in percentage points).  Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. Significance levels: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *
 
0.1. 
Among the protest variables, higher levels of authoritarian political 
engineering resulted in an average increase of 3.4 percentage points in invalid 
voting. Although electoral manipulation also boosted illegal abstention, the impact 
of this predictor on absenteeism was much more variable across states and 
elections. The positive and strongly significant effect of Inflation on invalid voting 
suggests that blank and null ballots might reflect not only popular dissatisfaction 
with inadequate representative institutions, but also discontent with poor 
macroeconomic performance and economic mismanagement by the political elites. 
While these results support the “protest hypothesis” of invalid voting, they also 
suggest that less educated and newly enfranchised voters in Brazil face considerable 
barriers to voting (Power and Roberts, 1995).  The evidence is far less conclusive in 
the case of electoral absenteeism, underscoring the need to examine additional 
confounding factors – not considered so far in the literature - that might affect 
noncompliance with compulsory voting laws.  
Remarkably, while all the socio-economic variables tend to affect both 
sources of abstention in the same direction, many of the institutional and protest 
variables exhibit opposite average effects on the two forms of non-voting. In 
particular, two relevant institutional features of the open-list PR system used in 
Brazil’s lower house election, namely, a large number of candidates and the use of 
a single official ballot, have a positive impact on invalid voting but a negative 
influence on illegal abstention. The opposite effect of Ballot and Candidates per 
seat on the two forms of non-voting suggests that there might be a certain trade-off 
between attracting voters to the polls and facilitating effective electoral 
participation. Factors that give voters more opportunities to affect electoral results 
ex-ante, such as the availability of more electoral options and a ballot design that 
gives voters more freedom to choose their preferred candidate, tend to increase 
turnout. However, at the moment of casting a ballot, the proliferation of candidates 
and the requirement that voters recall their preferred candidate’s name or 
registration number tend to increase invalid voting, probably because they impose 
substantial informational demands and heavy decision-making costs on the 
electorate, especially in the context of high illiteracy rates and massive expansion of 
the franchise experienced in Brazil throughout the 
4.3. Comparison with alternative modeling approaches  
 century. 
 
Figure 6 below compares the estimated causal effects of selected predictors under 
Model 1-b with those obtained under alternative empirical approaches commonly 
used to analyze abstention in compulsory voting systems. Model 2 uses separate 
ordinary least squares regressions for invalid voting and absenteeism, assuming 
independence among observations and simply pooling state- and country-level 
predictors. Model 3 uses separate hierarchical linear models for invalid voting and 
absenteeism, accounting for the temporal and geographical clustering of the data 
but ignoring non-negativity and unit-sum constraints. Finally, Model 4 is a 
compositional model with random intercepts for each state but no election-random 
effects, again assuming a deterministic relationship between national- and state-
level predictors. 17
The results summarized in the figure show some noticeable differences 
between the four models. First, standard errors under Model 1-b tend to be 
considerably smaller than for Model 3 and much larger than for Models 2 and 4, 
especially for the country-level predictors. This leads to different conclusions about 
the statistical significance of the impact of the national-level variables on invalid 
voting and electoral absenteeism under the different models. For instance, setting 
the stochastic terms in 
  
tη  to zero in Models 2 and 4 leads to significant effects of 
economic growth and electoral manipulation on absenteeism at the 0.01 level. 
Neither of these variables have a systematic effect on abstention under Models 1 
                                                 
17 In the case of Models 3 and 4, a bivariate Student-t distribution was used for the data model, while 
multivariate Normal distributions were specified for the random coefficients. The substantive results 
reported below remain unchanged if Gaussian distributions are assumed for the level-1 errors as 
well. All four models were fit in WinBUGS. The corresponding codes are included in the 
supplementary materials accompanying this paper.  
and 3 even at the 0.05 level. In contrast, Illiteracy is significantly and positively 
correlated with electoral absenteeism under Model 1-b, but not for any of the other 
3 models. On the other hand, the large standard errors for Model 3 determine that 
none of the national-level variables has a significant effect on either source of 
abstention at the usual confidence levels. 
Even the sign of some of the estimated marginal effects differ across the 
four models. For instance, a higher number of Candidates per seat has a positive 
average effect on invalid voting under Model 1-b, suggesting that a larger number 
of contestants increases the likelihood of voter error and/or makes it more difficult 
for voters to choose a single preferred candidate. In contrast, the number of 
candidates and the proportion of blank and null ballots are negatively correlated 
under the other 3 models. FEAP, on the other hand, has a negative and significant 
impact on invalid voting under Model 4, but a positive – though not statistically 
significant – effect under the other models.  Also, as seen in the lower panel of 
Figure 6, the results from Models 2 and 4 indicate that that the extension of voting 
rights to illiterates led to significantly lower levels of electoral absenteeism, 
suggesting that this group of new voters was more likely to show up at the polls 
even when - unlike for literate citizens - voting is optional for illiterates. The 
average effect of Franchising on electoral absenteeism has the opposite sign under 
Models 1-b and 3. Finally, and in contrast to the other three models, Ballot has a 
negative and marginally significant effect on invalid voting under Model 2, leading 
to the rather implausible conclusion that the introduction of a more complex ballot 
system that requires considerably more information on the part of voters resulted in 
lower rates of blank and spoiled ballots.  
 
Figure 6: Estimated marginal effects of selected predictors across models, in 
percentage points. The graph shows the effect of a one-unit change in each of the 
predictors on invalid voting (upper panel) and electoral absenteeism (lower panel). The 
center dots correspond to the point estimates, the thicker lines to the 50% credible intervals, 
and the thinner lines to the 90% credible intervals. 
 
 
 
These conflicting results lead to different substantive conclusions about the 
relative validity of alternative theories proposed to account for abstention under 
mandatory voting and might entail different implications regarding, for instance, 
the design of electoral systems and the institutional reforms needed to promote and 
consolidate political participation in compulsory voting systems (Power and 
Roberts, 1995). It is therefore important to determine which model fits the data 
better. Following Iyengar and Dey (2004), a plausible comparison criteria based on 
the discrepancy between observed and simulated data would favor the model that 
minimizes the predictive loss ( ) ( )2Rep Rep, Obs Obs Obsd P P E P P P= − , which can be 
estimated as:  
 
                            ( )
2
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, ,
1 1 1
1n T J jObs
i t i t
i t j
d P P
J= = =
 
= −  
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∑∑ ∑                                  (13), 
 
where ( ) ( )( )1, , ,,...,Rep Rep JRepi t i t i tP P P=  denotes the data sampled from the predictive 
distribution ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,| | |Rep Obs Rep Obsi t i t i t i tp P P p P p P dθ θ θ= ∫  under each model.18
Table 5 reports the point estimates (means) and 90% credible intervals for 
the posterior predictive loss based on 
  
1,000J =  hypothetical replications of ,
I
i tP  
and ,
A
i tP  for the four models. The compositional-hierarchical model exhibits the 
lowest discrepancy between the replicated and the actual data (at the 0.01 level). In 
contrast, the two models that implement separate univariate analyses for each 
source of abstention have the highest estimated predicted losses. In particular, 
                                                 
18 In the case of the compositional-hierarchical model, Rep,i tP  are obtained from ,
Rep
i tY  using the 
logarithmic transformations (1) and (2). 
Model 2, which in addition ignores the multilevel nature of the data, exhibits the 
worst fit.   
 
Model 
d  
1-b 
2.84 
(2.33, 3.51) 
2 
16.71 
( 13.72, 19.97) 
3 
8.33 
(7.33,  9.44) 
4 
6.59 
( 5.75, 7.55) 
 
                   modeling strategies.
                Table 5: Estimates of the Posterior Predictive Loss for alternative  
.  
 
Numbers in parenthesis are the 90% credible intervals. 
The superior performance of Model 1-b is also illustrated in Figure 7, which 
plots the actual proportions of invalid voting and absenteeism and the expected 
proportions under the four models, obtained by averaging ( )Rep, ,  1,...,1000,
j
i tP j =  over 
the simulations. As seen in the figure, Models 2 and 3 lead to negative expected 
proportions of invalid votes for 49% and 14% of the state-years in the sample, 
respectively. While both compositional models avoid this problem, relaxing the 
assumption of a deterministic relationship between national- and state-level 
predictors and allowing for additional variability in the election-effects results in a 
better fit for Model 1-b vis-à-vis Model 4.  
 
 
Figure 7: Actual and expected proportions of invalid voting and electoral absenteeism 
under alternative modeling strategies. The gray circles correspond to the expected 
proportion of invalid voting and electoral absenteeism for each state-election of the sample 
for the model under consideration. The black circles correspond to the actual values.  
 
Hence, the evidence presented above indicates that the statistical model 
developed in this paper provides a much improved fit over the other three modeling 
approaches considered, and suggests that the methodological differences between 
these competing empirical strategies may have substantial consequences in terms of 
the analysis of the determinants of abstention under compulsory voting. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Different theories, drawing on the literature on voter turnout in industrialized 
countries, have been proposed to explain the prevalence of invalid voting and 
electoral absenteeism in compulsory voting systems. This paper integrates the 
socioeconomic, institutional, and political-protest approaches in a statistical model 
aimed at analyzing the determinants of both sources of abstention in district-level 
elections. The model presented here accounts for the compositional and hierarchical 
structure of district-level electoral data and addresses robustness concerns raised by 
the use of small sample sizes typically available for democracies with mandatory 
voting, most of which are recently democratized Latin American nations. 
 Results obtained from the application of the model to data from Brazil’s 
legislative elections allow drawing interesting substantive and methodological 
conclusions. The evidence presented above reveals considerable differences in the 
determinants of both forms of non-voting. In line with Power and Roberts (1995), I 
find that the proportion of blank and null ballots in Brazil’s lower house elections 
was strongly positively related both to political protest and to the existence of 
important informational barriers to voting, in particular for less educated and newly 
enfranchised voters. The influence of these variables on illegal abstention, however, 
was less evident. In addition, some of the institutional characteristics of the 
electoral system, such as the proliferation of candidates and the introduction of a 
complex ballot design, seem to affect the two sources of abstention in opposite 
directions. Comparisons based on posterior simulations indicate that the model 
presented here fits the data better than several alternative empirical strategies 
commonly used in previous studies on this topic. More importantly, some of the 
substantive conclusions and the policy implications derived from the 
compositional-hierarchical model differed from those drawn from less appropriate 
modeling approaches.  
Although the model was applied to the particular case of Brazil, it provides 
a general tool to analyze the determinants of abstention in compulsory systems. 
Potential avenues for future research would be to examine the determinants of 
illegal abstention in greater detail – which, as noted above, does not seem to be 
strongly related to either protest voting or institutional variables – and to analyze 
the performance of the model and the robustness of the findings reported here from 
a comparative perspective. From a methodological standpoint, using non-
parametric methods to estimate the joint density of invalid voting and absenteeism 
would allow examining their determinants and interactions without imposing 
specific parametric distributions. 
 
Appendix - Full Conditional Posterior Distributions  
 
Assuming conditional independence throughout, the model presented in Section 3 
can be specified in a Bayesian context as: 
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with conjugate priors for the fixed effects and the precision matrices: 
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Assuming that all the , ,  1,..., ,  1,..., ,i tw i n t T= =  are mutually independent, 
the joint posterior density of all the unknown parameters of the model is given by:  
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Given ( )',1 ,,...,i n Tw w w=  the full conditional posterior densities of 
{ } { }, , , ,t i ηβ λ δ Σ Ω  and λΩ  are:19
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19 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  stands for conditioning on the data and on the remaining parameters. 
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To complete the specification for a Gibbs sampling scheme, the full conditional 
posterior distributions of w  and υ  are required:  
 
                 ( ) ( ) ( ), 1, , , , , , ,exp '  2
i t
i t i t i t i t t i i t i t t i i tw w Y X Y X p w
ω
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                       ( ) ( ),
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p p wυ υ υ
= =
⋅⋅⋅ ∝ ∏∏                                                               (26), 
 
with ( ),i tp w υ  depending on the particular normal/independent distribution adopted 
for the level-1 errors. In the case of Model 1-b, which assumes 
( ), / 2, / 2i tw Gammaυ υ υ , , 0, 0i tw υ> > , (25) and (26) become: 
 
                ( ) ( )1, , , , ,11,  '  2 2i t i t i t t i i t i t t iw Gamma Y X Y X
υ
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∑∑                      (26’). 
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